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ABSTRACT 
 
In the 18
th
 century, even at the very heart of the wars, belligerents’ trade was not fully 
interrupted. One way to continue the commercial shipping was to appeal to neutral 
flags. The object of this paper is to see how the uses of the advantages of neutrality 
contributed to maintain and even increase the general globalisation of trade in the 
context of the 18
th
 century overseas wars. In the Caribbean, under the cover of their 
neutrality, Dutch and Danish little islands were not just a place where enemy subjects 
could met, it was also convenient for quick naturalisations that allowed forbidden 
commercial relations between enemies. This story shows how transimperial commercial 
exchanges were deeply rooted and the impossibility even for the most powerful navy to 
control the reality of global trade. During the second part of the American 
Revolutionary War, Denmark remained the neutral power with the most important fleet. 
The Danes took benefit of their neutral status to open a direct trade with Venezuela and 
made impressive progresses in the Asiatic trade. In the particular circumstances of 
wartime, neutral shipping and trade could be an opportunity for both belligerents and 
non-belligerents. The first one found a way to continue their commerce even with 
enemy partners, and the second improved their shipping and trade and could under their 
name earn more money just by covering the belligerents’ activity. For neutrals on the 
whole, 18
th
 century wars can also be considered as a fruitful period and a time of 
progress allowing access to new markets.  
 
KEYWORDS: 18
th
 century; war; America; Caribbean; neutrality; international 
commerce; smuggling. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Au XVIII
e
 siècle, même au cœur des conflits, le commerce des belligérants n’est jamais 
totalement interrompu. Un des moyens pour continuer à assurer les échanges extérieurs 
et d’avoir recours aux pavillons neutres. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment 
l’utilisation des avantages de la neutralité a permis de nourrir, voire même d’accentuer, 
la mondialisation du commerce dans le contexte des guerres maritimes du XVIII
e
 siècle. 
Aux Antilles, grâce à la couverture de leur neutralité, les petites îles hollandaises et 
danoises ne sont pas seulement des lieux où les sujets de puissances ennemies peuvent 
se rencontrer, elles permettent également d’obtenir des naturalisations rapides qui 
permettent d’entretenir des relations commerciales entre ennemis. Ce constat montre le 
profond ancrage des circulations commerciales transimpériales et l’incapacité, même 
pour la marine la plus puissante de son temps de contrôler des échanges toujours plus 
globaux. Dans la seconde phase de la guerre d’Indépendance, le Danemark demeure la 
seule puissance neutre dotée d’une flotte importante. Les Danois profitent de cette 
situation pour inaugurer un commerce direct avec le Venezuela et faire de gros progrès 
dans les échanges avec l’Asie. Dans le contexte particulier des temps de guerre, la 
navigation et le commerce neutres présentent des avantages tant pour les belligérants 
que pour les non-belligérants. Les premiers y trouvent un moyen d’entretenir leur 
commerce, même avec l’ennemi, alors que les seconds développent leur flotte et leur 
activité marchande tout en engrangeant des profits par la prise en charge de l’activité 
des belligérants. Pour les neutres, dans l’ensemble, les guerres du XVIIIe siècle peuvent 
être considérées comme des périodes de prospérité et de progrès qui permettent 
d’accéder à de nouveaux marchés. 
 
KEYWORDS: 18
e
 siècle; guerre; Amérique; Antilles; neutralité; commerce 
international; interlope. 
 
 
NEUTRADIDAD Y GLOBALIZACIÓN DEL COMERCIO EN LAS GUERRAS 
DEL SIGLO XVIII 
 
RESUMEN 
 
En el siglo XVIII, incluso en el corazón mismo de las guerras, el comercio de 
beligerantes no se interrumpió por completo. Una forma de continuar con el mismo era 
apelar a las banderas neutrales. El objetivo de este artículo es ver cómo los usos de la 
neutralidad generaron ventajas que contribuyeron a mantener -e incluso aumentar- la 
globalización general del comercio, en el contexto de las guerras de ultramar del siglo 
XVIII. El Caribe holandés y danés no fue sólo un lugar donde los enemigos podían 
reunirse, sino también un espacio conveniente para las rápidas naturalizaciones que 
permitían las relaciones comerciales prohibidas entre enemigos. Esta historia muestra 
cómo los intercambios comerciales transimperiales estaban profundamente arraigados y 
la imposibilidad incluso de que la marina más poderosa controlara la realidad del 
comercio global. Durante la segunda parte de la Guerra de la Independencia de los 
Estados Unidos, Dinamarca siguió siendo la potencia neutral con la flota más 
importante. Los daneses se beneficiaron de su neutralidad en los conflictos para abrir un 
comercio directo con Venezuela e hicieron progresos impresionantes en el territorio 
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asiático. En las circunstancias particulares de la guerra, el envío y el comercio neutral 
podrían ser una oportunidad tanto para los beligerantes como para los no involucrados. 
Los primeros encontraron una manera de continuar su comercio incluso con socios 
enemigos. Los segundos, mejoraron sus proyectos comerciales dado que, bajo el 
nombre de la neutralidad, podrían ganar más dinero sólo al cubrir la actividad de los 
beligerantes. De modo que, para los neutrales en general, las guerras del siglo XVIII 
también pueden considerarse como un período fructífero y un tiempo de progreso que 
les permitió el acceso a nuevos mercados. 
 
PALABRS CLAVES: siglo XVIII; guerra; América; Caribe; neutralidad; comercio 
internacional; contrabando. 
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NEUTRAL COVER AND GLOBALISED COMMERCE IN THE 
WARS OF THE 18
TH
 CENTURY 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Commerce has become one of the main objects which disturb and divide them 
[the nations and the sovereigns]” insisted the French author Jacques Accarias de 
Sérionne in the 1760.
1
 
Indeed, in the wake of colonisation and mercantile globalisation, the rivalry for 
extra-European commerce became a central issue, mainly between the two major 
European powers, France and Great Britain, but also for other countries.  The “Jealousy 
of Trade” as stressed by David Hume, (1777 : 327-331)2 made commerce a decisive 
factor in the balance of power in Europe and in the world. In peacetime, the goal of 
trade was to increase exports to earn money from foreign countries, to increase shipping 
and thus indirectly sea power. Commerce was also important in wartime, whether in 
trying to hamper the enemy’s economy in the hope of crippling its abilities to continue 
fighting, or to protect one’s own resources to maintain one’s own military and economic 
strength.  
From the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) onwards, harassing the enemy’s maritime 
commerce was a key strategy for belligerents: “The more of the enemy’s ships you 
captured or sank and the fewer of your own you lost, the better for your trade: that 
seemed to be the gist of the matter” rightly asserted English historian George Clark. 
(1928: 26) The objective of this “skilled” warfare was, as Jean Sebastien le Preste de 
Vauban stressed, to “cut the sinews of war” by paralysing the enemy’s economy. 
(VILLIERS, 2007: 338) In these circumstances, the question of neutrality, of neutral 
duties and rights, and neutrals’ relations with belligerents became a major issue in 
international relations. Through a combination of principles and experiences, European 
                                                 
1
 “Le Commerce est devenu l’un des principaux objets qui les agitent & les divisent [les Nations & les 
Souverains]”, ACCARIAS DE SERIONNE, J. Intérêts des nations de l’Europe dévelopés relativement 
au commerce, t. 2, Leiden, 1766, p. 300. 
2
 For a comprehensive analysis of this notion see: (HONT, 2005) 
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powers gradually built up a framework for both the theoretical and practical exercise of 
neutrality in order to protect the rights and liberties of peaceful countries in wartime. 
This general trend occurred within a context of globalisation of the rivalries and 
conflicts among the major European powers. In particular, the Franco-British wars 
increasingly spilled outside Europe into America and in Asia as well. As the 
geographical scope of war was extended, so was the scope of neutrality. Colonisation, 
the growth of international shipping and trade, and extending war to encompass enemy 
commerce and navigation expanded the issues of neutrality beyond the European world.  
 From the War of Spanish Succession to the American Revolution, European 
rivalries in America were dominated by the struggle between France and its Bourbon 
ally Spain against England, then Great Britain. War disrupted commercial exchanges 
between the European home countries and their colonies, however, that does not mean 
that trade was interrupted. One way to continue commercial shipping was to appeal to 
neutral flags. Even though covering belligerent trade by neutral colours was a common 
practice in Europe, (SCHNAKENBOURG, 2011: 101-119) it took on new forms in the 
Caribbean. Indeed, the interweaving of close territorial sovereignties, the ease of 
travelling by sea, the important contraband trade, the pattern of the West Indian 
economy, and the distance from Europe resulted in specific characteristics of belligerent 
commerce under neutral cover. Here, the practices and customs of neutrality as 
established in Europe were challenged by the patterns of overseas shipping and trade. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how the uses and the misuses of the advantages 
of neutrality maintained and even increased the overall globalisation of trade in the 18
th
-
century overseas wars. The issue of neutrality and colonial commerce in this period was 
studied in the 1930s by the English historian Richard Pares (1963). I would like to 
explore this subject in light of recent trends in the history of European empires. More 
particularly, neutrality offers a rich perspective for investigating trans-imperial 
relations. Wartime could be a prosperous time for neutrals to take advantage of the 
circumstances in order to serve both sides. Using neutral cover was a way to thwart the 
belligerents’ strategy, since it allowed neutrals to supply all the warring parties, to hide 
exchanges between enemies, and also to expand the involvement of the neutral flag in 
global commerce. 
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Neutrality and commerce with the enemy in the Caribbean during the War of 
Spanish Succession 
 
 Along with the great powers settled in America, minor powers such as the 
United Provinces and Denmark also had colonies. When neutral, they tried to benefit 
from the wartime context. For example, Denmark continued to maintain its neutrality 
throughout the Franco-English wars of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. The Danes gained 
three colonies in the Virgin Islands archipelago: Saint Thomas in 1672, Saint John in 
1718 and Saint Croix in 1734. In peacetime, these colonies were active smuggling 
centres and in wartime commerce there flourished thanks to Danish neutrality. As 
Denmark had a limited population (1.2 million people including Norway at that time, 
governed from Copenhagen) and lacked the money to exploit its colonies, colonial 
development had to depend on foreigners’ commerce. Dutch, English and French 
people were the most numerous foreigners there at the end of the 17
th
 century. (HALL, 
1992: 6, 9-10) During the War of Spanish Succession, Charlotte Amalie, the main port 
in Saint Thomas, enjoyed a period of great prosperity. According to French author 
Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, it was the  
 
“refuge for all merchant ships which, chased in wartime, found there a neutral port. It was 
the warehouse of all exchanges that the neighbouring people could not make elsewhere 
with such ease and security. From there, richly loaded ships were sent every day for 
clandestine trade with the Spanish coast...finally, Saint Thomas was a place where a great 
deal of very important business was done”.3 
  
This Danish colony was not just a place where enemy subjects could meet, it was also 
convenient for quick naturalisations that then allowed commercial relations that had 
been forbidden between enemies. Indeed, during the War of Spanish Succession, in the 
French colony of Saint Domingue contraband trade was dynamic thanks to Danish 
merchants who, in reality, were English.  
 For example, this was the case of Peter Smith, officially a subject of the Danish 
king, but he had been born English, and was an owner of stores and ships. During the 
war, he maintained regular trade between Saint Thomas, Saint Domingue and 
                                                 
3
 “L’asile de tous les batiments marchands qui, poursuivis en temps de guerre, y trouvaient un port 
neutre. C’était l’entrepôt de tous les échanges que les peuples voisins n’auraient pu faire ailleurs avec 
autant d’aisance & de sureté. C’est de là qu’on expédiait tous les jours des bateaux richement chargés 
pour un commerce clandestin avec les cotes espagnoles, ... Saint-Thomas était enfin une place où se 
faisaient des marchés très importants”, (RAYNAL, 1780 t. 3: 318). 
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Martinique in broad daylight. He earned a lot of money this way and was considered at 
that time as “the greatest merchant there”.4 At the end of 1703, one of his ships sailing 
under Danish colours was seized by a privateer from Barbados and condemned by the 
Vice-Admiralty of Jamaica. Danish Governor Hanssen took up Smith’s defence as a 
matter of respect for Danish neutrality. He asked for the release of the ship, which was 
under Danish flag, and endowed with official Danish papers in due form.
5
 Even though 
the English had warned the inhabitants of Saint Thomas that their commerce with the 
French and Spaniards was illegal and contrary to good Anglo-Danish relations, they had 
no real means to stop it.
6
 At the same time, the governor of Barbados, Bevil Granville, 
asked his government in London about a certain Manuel Manasses Gilligan, recently 
naturalised Danish who, with total impunity, did business with the enemy under the 
cover of neutrality. In 1703, one of Gilligan’s ships involved in commerce with the 
enemy was captured and it was sent to trial. Granville clearly warned that if Gilligan 
was not punished, some of the English settled in Saint Thomas would take advantage of 
the circumstances to trade with the French and the Spanish territories.
7
 The Vice-
Admiralty of Barbados returned a verdict that the prize had been a good one, but the 
ship was released on appeal in London. According to the General Attorney, Edward 
Northey, while naturalisation without any permission does not exempt a subject from 
following his king’s orders, Gilligan who actually lived in Saint Thomas, cannot be 
condemned if as a neutral subject he simply traded innocent goods with the French and 
the Spanish: “I do not take simple trading with an enemy to be high treason unless it be 
in such trade as furnishes the enemy with stores of war”.8 Like many other merchants in 
these circumstances, Peter Smith openly continued to furnish provisions to Saint 
Domingue and Martinique until the end of the war,
9
 whereas Gilligan dealt mostly in 
the slave trade from Danish and Dutch colonies to the Spanish American mainland.
10
  
                                                 
4
 “An account of persons trading with pirates” Oglethorp to Hedges, 27 January 1706, Calendar of State 
Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, [thereafter CSP], vol. 23, London, p. 24, and Oglethorp to 
Sunderland, 19 May 1710, CSP, vol. 25, London, 1924, p. 105. See: (FROSTIN, 1973: 339-341). 
5
 Claus Hansen, gouvernor of Saint Thomas, to Thomas Handasyd, gouvernor of Jamaica, 26 October 
1703, CSP, vol. 21, op. cit., p. 842-843. 
6
 Ibid., Handasyd to Hanssen, 26 October 1703, p.843. 
7
 Ibid., Granville to William Popple, 31 October 1703, p. 788. 
8
 Attorney General to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 22 March 1704, CSP, vol. 22, London, 1916, 
p. 82. 
9
 Oglethorp to Sunderland, 19 May 1710, CSP, vol. 25, op. cit., p. 105; (FROSTIN, 1973: 339-341). 
10
 This trade earned Gilligan the reputation as an expert in the field of Spanish American commerce and 
was sent to Madrid for the negotiation of the Asiento in 1712, (STEIN and STEIN, 2000: 137). 
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 While at the time of the War of Spanish Succession, Granville called Saint 
Thomas a “staple for all sort of indirect and illegal trade and commerce”,11 the English 
courts lacked a legal basis for a real punishment of what seemed to be a misuse of 
Danish neutral cover. In fact, from the English point of view, the problem was not really 
Danish neutral trade, but the English trade under Danish cover since the “true” Danes 
were not involved in Intra Caribbean exchanges.
12
 Even worse, false neutral trade 
covered exchanges with the enemy that already existed in peacetime as contraband. In 
spite of the firmness of the English governors’ discourse, trade with the French enemy 
through English-naturalised Danes was a real problem. With the exception of 
contraband goods, there was no legal way to condemn this trade and therefore no way to 
stop it. In this case, the problem was not neutrality in itself or the scope of neutral 
rights, but rather the improper use of neutrality. However, this story shows how trans-
imperial commercial exchanges were deeply rooted and the impossibility for even the 
most powerful navy to control actual global trade. This problem reappeared some 
decades later during the Seven Years’ War. 
 
The neutral cover of French trade during the Seven Years’ War 
 
From the very first year of the war against France in 1756, the British government 
decided not to conquer the French islands in the Caribbean but to weaken their 
commerce in order to harm France’s economy. In 1757, London decided to concentrate 
the war effort on the French colonies. (PARES, 1963: 384-387; CORBETT, 1907: 390-
393) The British governors received orders to prohibit any supply sent to the enemy 
colonies, and the Leeward Islands squadron under Admiral John Moore was reinforced 
in order to intercept shipping intended for the French. (PARES, 1963: 368-369; 
BUCHET, 1991: 379-381) The British strategy was successful and truly harmed 
relations between France and its colonies. At the beginning of the war, just under 300 
French ships were captured in the Atlantic, among them one-third from Bordeaux. 
(BUTEL, 1973: 818) The direct trade from this port to the Caribbean fell by three-
quarters between 1756 and 1758, and by 87% in 1760. (SCHUMANN and 
SCHWEIZER, 2008: 105) At that time, French ships rarely ventured to sail in 
                                                 
11
 Granville to the Council for Trade and Plantations, 3 September 1703, CSP, op. cit., p. 666. 
12
 For a study of Danish colonial trade see: (GØBEL, 2015; WESTERGAARD, 1917). 
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Caribbean waters. Indeed, since the beginning of the war, a large part of French 
commerce continued under neutral cover. Coastal navigation maintained Caribbean 
trade between French and Dutch territories, particularly Saint Eustatius. Along with 
Curacao, it became an important warehouse, a kind of gateway between Europe and 
America characterised by its cosmopolitanism.
13
 Once French colonial products arrived 
in Saint Eustatius, they were transferred onto large ships and sent to Europe. In the other 
direction, the island was the port of entry for European products intended primarily for 
the French colonies. (GOSLINGA, 1985: 210) The British knew that neutral shipping, 
mainly Dutch, was sustaining the French colonies. The Dutch traded under the pretence 
of acknowledging the free commerce of innocent goods included in their 1674 treaty 
with England. The “free ships, free goods” clause, although not formally stated, was 
from then on a bone of contention with the English, especially during the Seven Years’ 
War, as the Dutch claimed this right to be able to trade with the French colonies. But the 
London government countered that the 1674 treaty was for Europe only and could not 
be claimed for American trade, which meant the abrogation of the “free ships, free 
goods” principle. (PARES, 1938: 189) For this reason, since the beginning of the war, 
some of the Dutch ships coming from or going to French islands had been arrested. The 
noose was tightening from summer 1758 onwards when Dutch and, to a lesser extent, 
Danish ships trading with their own islands suffered some seizures. (CARTER, 1971: 
106) Little by little the French territories were practically under blockade, and their 
relations with European neutral ports were almost suspended. The British strategy was 
thus successful and enabled the conquest of Guadeloupe in 1759 and Martinique in 
1762. At the end of the war, Saint Domingue was the only territory held by the French. 
Even though its commerce fell dramatically, the colony was not isolated and survived 
thanks to neutral cover, to the great displeasure of the British.  
 For the British, the key point was the difference between neutral commerce with 
the enemy and for the enemy. (MARRIOTT, 1758) As the French Exclusif system 
forbade foreign ships from entering a colonial port, any neutral ship that came and went 
openly from a French port ought to be considered as French, as enemy, and 
                                                 
13
 “Never did I meet with such variety...here was a merchant vending his goods in Dutch, another in 
French, and a third in Spanish” Journal of a lady of quality; being the narrative of a journey from 
Scotland to the West Indies, North Carolina, and Portugal, in the years 1774 to 1776, (WALKER 
ANDREWS, 1922: 135-136). 
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consequently liable to seizure.
14
 The first victim of this principle was the Dutch ship 
America, arrested in 1757 on her way back from Saint Domingue and finally 
condemned on appeal in 1759. The access to a port reserved for French subjects, the 
observance of French rules, and the loading of an enemy cargo justified that “the said 
ship ought by law to be considered in this case as a French ship” and inevitably 
condemned. (WOOLSEY, 1910: 836)
15
 This line of argument was the basis of the “Rule 
of the War of 1756”16.  
 “The Rule of the War of 1756” was convenient for hindering the neutral ships 
visiting French ports, but it did not solve the problem of enemy goods carried by coastal 
navigation to a neutral island then reloaded onto a neutral ship to Europe and finally to 
France. In that case, the journey was between two neutral ports or between a neutral 
port and a belligerent port, both cases admitted by the law of neutrality. In order to put 
an end to these kinds of practises, the British developed the “Doctrine of Continuous 
Voyage” from 1761. (BRIGGS, 1926: 14; WOOLSEY, 1910: 822-847; PARES, 1938: 
204-225) It took into account the journey of the goods from their departure to their 
arrival, no matter if, on their way, they were carried by a neutral ship and passed neutral 
ports. For instance, a cargo from Saint Domingue landing in Saint Eustatius then to 
Amsterdam and finally headed for France, could be considered as an export from a 
French place to another one and therefore liable to seizure. The “Rule of the war of 
1756” and the “doctrine of continuous voyage” are related to two neutral relations 
considered by the British as partially in favour of the French. The English measures 
rested on the principle that flags and passports, which both testified nationality, were 
not sufficiently reliable for considering the fairness of a neutral shipping and trade. But 
neutral cover could be used in another way when neutral subjects, ships, and flags acted 
as go-betweens on a small scale, as shown by the success of Montechristi. 
Montechristi was a tiny isolated village on the northwest coast of the Spanish part 
of the island of Hispaniola, very close to the French frontier of Saint Domingue. It had 
                                                 
14
 “Where a neutral is engaged in a trade which is exclusively confined to the subjects of a country [...]  
and interdicted to all others, and cannot be avowedly carried on in the name of a foreigner, such a trade is 
considered so entirely national that it must follow the hostile situation of the country.” Opinion of the 
British admiralty quoted by: (KULSRUD, 1936: 79; MARRIOTT, 1758: 18-29). 
15
 In 1761, the Lord chief justice of England, William Mansfield, specified the rule for the treatment of 
neutral ships visiting French colonies: “The rule is, that if a neutral ship trades to a French colony, with 
all the privileges of a French ship, and is thus adopted and naturalized, it must be looked upon as a French 
ship, and is liable to be taken.” Cited in: (JESSUP and DEÁK, 1976: 155). 
16
 The best account of the “Rule of the War of 1756” can be found in: (PARES, 1938: 180-204). 
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no relations by land with the rest of the Spanish territories and so little trade was done 
by sea that no customs officers were established there. It was thus a de facto free port 
where trade was under no one’s control. (TRUXES, 2008: 79; PARES, 1956: 61) The 
Seven Years’ War and Spanish neutrality, until 1762, changed Montechristi into a 
commercial hub between the French and the English, mainly North Americans, under 
neutral cover as explained by Raynal:  
 
“Monte-Christo was only a warehouse where English smugglers usually came to load 
commodities from the few plantations in the neighbourhood. The hostilities between the 
courts of London & Versailles made these fraudulent relations more significant & this 
market then took on great importance”.17  
 
The story of the Speewell from Newport, Rhode Island, in 1757 shows how the hub of 
Montechristi worked. Once there, the ship and its cargo were sold by a fake sale to a 
Spanish subject who hired a Spanish crew and thus became neutral. The ship then went 
to the closest French port were its cargo of lumber and commodities was exchanged for 
sugar, coffee and indigo. Then the ship went back to Montechristi and was resold to her 
previous owner before returning to Rhode Island. (PITMAN, 1917: 314-316; PARES, 
1936: 457 and 460; SIMPSON, 2012: 66) North Americans also sometimes sold their 
cargo to Spanish strawmen who conducted business under their name in the French 
territory, before selling the products back to their first partners. The bay of 
Montechristi, under the cover of Spanish neutrality, became the main hub for exchange 
between Saint Domingue and the English colonies in North America and with Ireland. 
(FROSTIN, 1973: 601-602; PITMAN, 1917: 314-315) The lack of wharves and of 
warehouses in Montechristi shows that exchanged goods were only seldom landed. 
(TRUXES, 2008: 80) Its success was so great that in 1759 and 1760, sometimes over 
one hundred ships laid anchor at the same time off the coast of Montechristi. (TRUXES, 
2008: 79; PITMAN, 1917: 317; PARES, 1936: 457, 461-463) 
The English authorities knew very well that Montechristi was a false place of 
commerce, and that the ships officially coming back from Spanish Santo Domingo were 
loaded with French products, as Vice Admiral Charles Holmes admitted: “[Montechristi 
is] wholly French; and the Spaniards are only the porters of this trade”. (BEER, 2011: 
                                                 
17
 “Monte-Christo n’est qu’un entrepôt où des interlopes anglois viennent habituellement charger les 
denrées de quelques plantations françoises établies dans son voisinage. Les hostilités entre les cours de 
London & de Versailles rendent les liaisons frauduleuses infiniment plus considérables, & ce marché 
acquiert alors une grande importance”, (RAYNAL, 1780 t. 3: 256) 
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99,107-108) But the English captains and the French did not have any direct relations, 
as the shipowners clearly stated in their instructions. For example, this was the case for 
the Dolphin of New York:  
 
“You are positively ordered and directed that while you are at Monte Cristo, you do not 
by any means deal, trade or traffic with any subjects of the French King but solely with 
Spaniards, that the rascals who act as judges in some of the Admiralty courts in the West 
Indies may not have so much as a pretence to confiscate the vessel and the cargo”. 
(PARES, 1936: 459, 465-466) 
 
 As North Americans officially only conducted business with Spanish subjects, 
they were not condemned for trading with the enemy. Despite the evidence of trade with 
the French, English courts lacked legal grounds for condemning the intercepted ships on 
their way back from Montechristi. Based on papers certifying the purchase of their 
cargos by Spanish subjects, the North Americans asserted that they lawfully owned their 
cargo. The judges shared this opinion as in the verdict of 1762 concerning the 
Catherine, arrested on her way back from Montechristi. Lewis Morris, a judge from the 
Vice-Admiralty of New York, asserted:  
 
“I am clearly of opinion that the property of an English subject made out by clear and 
concluding proof is not subject to condemnation as prize to any private vessell of warr tho 
taken in any unlawful or forbidden commerce”. (HOUGH, 1925: 203) 
 
Indeed, almost all the cargos condemned at the first trial by the English Vice-
Admiralties in the Americas were released on appeal. (HARRINGTON, 1935: 261) A 
report from Jamaica written in 1760 presented some arguments against the trade at 
Montechristi. Its author refuted Montechristi’s status as a free port since it had not been 
proclaimed before the war. He denounced the “imaginary port of Monto Christi [where] 
there are neither goods imported nor exported neither ships loaded nor unloaded”.18 The 
problem was the misuse of neutrality and the unfair behaviour of Spanish officers in 
Montechristi “the Spanish certificates and passes given at this place merit no credit. 
They bear no relation to truth and are illegal and unjust”19. While the author was right in 
                                                 
18
 “Memorial respecting Monto Christi in Hispaniola & the Correspondence and Trade carried on with the 
Enemy from the Bay Monto Christi by the King’s subjects and the subject of neutral Power under the 
Pretence of this place being a free port and protected by a Neutral Power” Jamaica, December 1760, 
National Archives [Kew, Great Britain], CO 325/2, fol. 36. 
19
 “Memorial respecting Monto Christi in Hispaniola & the Correspondence and Trade carried on with the 
Enemy from the Bay Monto Christi by the King’s subjects and the subject of neutral Power under the 
Pretence of this place being a free port and protected by a Neutral Power” Jamaica, December 1760, 
National Archives [Kew, Great Britain], CO 325/2, fol. 41. 
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substance, the fact was that under the cover of the Spanish neutral flag, some important 
transimperial exchanges took place in the American Atlantic. This paved the way for 
smuggling relations once peace was restored. Indeed, the development of neutral 
shipping and trade in world commerce during the 18
th
-century wars must not be taken 
only as an illusion, as a simple cover for belligerents’ trade. Rather, it had lasting effects 
on the opening of new markets for neutrals and therefore contributed to the increasing 
globalisation of trade. 
 
The enlarged horizons of Danish shipping and trade during the American 
Revolutionary War 
 
 In the 18th century, the most prosperous neutral world carriers were the Dutch. 
While their neutrality was a favourable factor in the growth of their commerce, it was 
also an important bone of contention with the British. But on 3 February 1781, the 
British attacked Saint Eustasius, the main Dutch warehouse in the Caribbean and 
nicknamed “the golden rock”. This put an end to Dutch participation in American 
Atlantic commerce and transatlantic exchanges for the remainder of the war. From that 
point on the Danes had the largest fleet of any neutral power in the Caribbean as well as 
in Asian trade.  
 From the beginning of the American Revolutionary War, the Danes sought to 
exploit their neutral status in global commerce starting with the Atlantic trade. This goal 
was behind the foundation in 1778 of a new West Indian trading company, the 
Kongelige Danske octroyerede Vestindiske Handelsselskab. (SVEISTRUP, 1942-1944: 
386-427) Inspired by the success of the Dutch neutrality, the Danes tried to make Saint 
Thomas the main commercial hub of the Caribbean. In the first years of the war, Danish 
Atlantic shipping increased significantly. In 1778, 48 ships left the Danish capital for 
the Caribbean, 64 in 1779, and 77 in 1780. (FELBÆK, 1997: 94) The fall of Saint 
Eustatius at the beginning of 1781 gave a big boost to Danish shipping and trade in the 
Atlantic. In 1781 and 1782, there were over 200 passports delivered for a journey from 
Denmark to the Caribbean. (ANDERSEN, 2006: 303; FELDBÆK, 1971: 207) The 
island of Saint Thomas experienced a dramatic rise in trade as shown by the increase of 
the entrance fees to Charlotte Amalia: from 20,000 rigsdalers before the war to 280,000 
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in 1782 (multiplied by 14!). (NATHANSON, 1836: 483; VIBÆK, 1966: 87) Saint 
Thomas extended the scope of its trade not only to exchanges between Europe, the 
Caribbean and North America but also to South America. (FELDBÆK, 1971: 116) 
 After war broke out between Great Britain and the United Provinces, Dutch 
commerce in America experienced a clear setback. Curacao, one of the main places for 
contraband with Venezuela, faced decline. As Caracas had lost one of its main outlets 
and was in need of European goods, the Compania Guipuzcoana de Caracas started 
looking for new business partners. As for the Danes, before 1781 they had no commerce 
with South America, but considering the situation, they started to think about using their 
neutrality to trade with the Spanish colonies on the mainland. In spring 1781, a 
negotiation began in Cadiz between Spanish merchants and the Danish consul there 
about sending ships from Spain to Saint Thomas. This discussion aroused the Danish 
government’s interest in the opportunity and the profits to be made in South American 
commerce. In 1782, some high-ranking aristocrats invested money in a sharehold 
company, the Handels og Kanalkompagni. This would be the framework for an 
expedition of three ships to Venezuela from Hamburg and Cadiz. (FELDBÆK, 1973: 
163-164) 
 On July 1782, the Gehejmeråd von Gähler left Altona for Saint Thomas, and 
from there sailed to Venezuela provided with a Spanish passport and papers from the 
administration of New Granada. Under the protection of a frigate, she went to La Guaira 
(north of Caracas) before returning to Saint Thomas. There, the ship recovered her full 
Danish character and headed for Altona. A few weeks later, the company’s two other 
ships made the same journey but arrived in Cadiz. (FELDBÆK, 1973: 168-170) During 
the following years, Danish commerce in Venezuela persisted, even though it was not 
very large compared to the previous Dutch trade, whereas before the American 
Revolutionary War it did not even exist. In the years 1785-1786, the Danish flag 
represented 18% of the departures from Curacao, which was still an important 
smuggling hub for New Granada commerce. (KLOOSTER, 2003: 206) 
In addition to their success in the Atlantic, the Danes took advantage of their 
neutrality to make impressive progress in Asian trade. Starting in 1620, Denmark 
participated in Asian trade for a long time through their factory in India, named 
Tranquebar, on the Coromandel coast. In 1755, the Danes gained a new factory, 
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Frederiksnagore, in the Bay of Bengal. Danish trade in Asia, India and China was the 
business of the Asiatisk Kompagni, founded in 1732 and enjoyed the monopoly on 
eastern trade until 1772. 
 Already during the Seven Years’ War, the French ambassador in Copenhagen 
had informed the directors of the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales that Danish 
ships could cover their business between France and its colonies in the Indian Ocean 
(Île de France, nowadays Mauritius, and Île Bourbon, nowadays, Réunion).
20
 From 
there, the cargo would be transferred onboard French ships, whereas the Danes could 
load coffee for Europe.
21
 In other words, the French wanted to use Danish neutrality to 
secure the Atlantic part of a journey to Asia. However, the project collapsed after a brief 
negotiation because of the Danish reluctance to be used just as a cover for French 
business and thus run the risk of jeopardizing their own shipping and trade to Asia. 
 During the American Revolutionary War, neutral status was very fruitful for 
Danish shipping and trade to Asia as testified by the French consul in Bergen (Norway), 
Jean-Etienne de Chezaulx. In 1783, he observed that several ships were fitted out in the 
Danish capital, whereas before the war just one or two expeditions had been organised 
to China and to India.
22
 This statement is confirmed by the study of Danish passports.
23
 
Before 1778, less than 5% of them were delivered for Asian trade, reaching 11.7% in 
1783. (FELDBÆK, 1973: 207) The value of Danish trade with India increased four-fold 
between the beginning and the end of the American Revolutionary War, particularly 
after 1781 and the start of the war between Great Britain and the United Provinces. 
(FELDBÆK, 1991: 24) With the withdrawal of the French and Dutch flags, there were 
good commercial opportunities for the Danes. But they did not have enough capital and 
ships to take full advantage of the circumstances, and the Asiatisk Kompagni had to seek 
English and Dutch investments and ships. The Danes even asked the French if they 
could use some English ships under Danish colours for Asian trade and made the same 
                                                 
20
 A.A.E. [Archives des Affaires Etrangères, La Courneuve, France], C.P. [Correspondance Politique], 
Danemark, vol. 138, fol. 481-507, “Lettres et mémoire des directeurs de la Compagnie des Indes 
orientales adressés à Bernis sur les propositions de l’ambassadeur Ogier de faire transporter des 
marchandises à l’île de France sous couleurs danoises”, September 1758 
21
 A.A.E., C.P., Danemark, vol. 139, fol. 142, Ogier à Choiseul, 21 octobre 1758, fol. 273-274, The 
directors of the Compagnie des Indes to Ogier, without date but gave by Ogier to Boullongne, Contrôleur 
général des Finances, 14 November 1758. 
22
 “Mémoire contenant des détails et des observations ...”, 18 February 1783, A.N.[Archives Nationales, 
Paris] Marine, B3/418, fol. 21 
23
 Every expedition beyond the Cape St Vincent (S-O of Portugal) had to have a passport, named an 
Algerian passport. 
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request in London for Dutch ships.
24
 But there were more transfers of enemy commerce 
under the neutral Danish flag in private shipping, especially for English merchants.
25
 
The support of English capital to the most important companies in Copenhagen was the 
foundation of the great prosperity of Asian Danish shipping and trade in the early 
1780s. (BARTON, 1986: 116) 
 The increase of the Danish shipping to India under cover of neutrality was so 
spectacular that it worried the British: “our inconvenience is their convenience, and it is 
they, not we, that prosper by our extirpation of the French and the Dutch”.26 But a closer 
look reveals a somewhat different picture, as the growth in Indian trade from 
Copenhagen cannot be found to the same extent at the arrival points in Tranquebar and 
Frederiksnagore, which did not prosper as they should. Even though theoretically, 
access to Danish factories in India was forbidden to foreigners, they became important 
smuggling hubs during the American Revolutionary War. In Bengal, a large share of 
English business was transferred to Danish ships because of Frederiksnagore’s 
proximity to Calcutta.
27
 This Danish factory was established on the west bank of the 
Hooghly River upstream from the English one; consequently, every ship sailing to 
Frederiksnagore had to pass through Calcutta. Indeed, some captains preferred to go to 
English factories where they could sell their cargo at a better price than in the Danish 
ones.
28
  
 The wartime context enabled Danish ships to extend their scope to regions they 
had not visited before the war. Direct trips were organised from Copenhagen to the 
French Mascarene Islands and to Batavia in the Dutch East Indies.
29
 Aside from 
Denmark, other neutral countries took advantage of their neutrality for starting or 
extending their Asian trade. Some Swedish ships arrived at the Mascarene Islands, 
                                                 
24
 A.A.E., C.P., Danemark, vol. 163, fol. 102-103, Sartine to Vergennes, 10 October 1780. For the 
London government, the neutralisation of the Dutch ships by the Danes would be contrary to “fair 
neutrality”, Suffolk to Morton Eden, 16 November and 28 December 1781, in: (CHANCE, 1926: 206, 
207).  
25
 In 1778, 4 Danish ships left for Asia, 2 for the Asiatisk Kompagni, 2 for private investors. In 1783, 
there were 19 departures, 5 for the company, 14 for private merchants, (RASCH and SVEISTRUP, 1948: 
104). 
26
 Anonymous English author quoted in: (FELDBÆK, 1969: 57). 
27
 Frederiksnagore, today named Serampore, and Calcultta are very close and belong today to the same 
urban area, and are today integrated into the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority 
28
 The then governor of Tranquebar complained about the fact that Danish captains thought they had no 
business in his factory, (FELDBÆK, 1969: 65). 
29
 During the war, three Danish ships arrived in Batavia and two in the l’Île de France, (FELDBÆK, 
1969: 63). 
“Neutral cover and…”                           Eric Schnakenbourg 
 
MAGALLÁNICA, Revista de Historia Moderna  ISSN 2422-779X 
5/10, (2019: 57-77)                                                          http://fh.mdp.edu.ar/revistas/index.php/magallanica 
 
73 
whereas Portuguese, Prussian, and Imperial flags also appeared in the Indian Ocean. 
(MÜLLER, 2011: 156; FELDBÆK, 1971: 124) Danes, like Swedes and other neutrals, 
also increased their involvement in the Chinese market, particularly in the tea trade. The 
import of tea to Europe jumped by 42% under the Danish flag, and 35% under the 
Swedish one during the American Revolutionary War. At that time, both Scandinavian 
countries were responsible for one-third of tea imports into Europe. (DERMIGNY, 
1964: 539; MÜLLER, 2010: 196-198) The majority was reexported as contraband to 
Great Britain, where prices rose. (RASCH and SVEISTRUP, 1948: 99, 110; BARTON, 
1986: 116) In India and in China, as in the Caribbean, South America and the 
Mediterranean, the neutral Danish had two ways to use their neutrality: they could either 
carry the trade of belligerents under their flag, or increase their own trade in the hope of 
selling goods in Europe at a large profit.  
Thus, the use of neutrality gave real momentum to Danish global shipping and 
trade. Their neutral status allowed them to sustain trade with distant places and to open 
new markets. Finally, in the middle of the 1780s, thanks to neutrality, Denmark became 
a real global commercial power involved in the worldwide circulation of commodities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although war truly disturbed ordinary commerce, we must not consider wartime 
as merely a disaster for trade because of the burdens belligerents imposed on their 
enemy’s shipping and trade. In the particular circumstances of wartime, neutral shipping 
and trade was an opportunity for both belligerents and non-belligerents. The former 
found ways to continue their commerce even with enemy partners, and the latter 
improved their shipping and trade by covering the belligerents’ activity. For neutrals on 
the whole, 18th-century wars may also be considered a fruitful period and a time of 
progress opening access to new markets. The globalisation of war and trade allowed 
some unprecedented uses of neutrality in Atlantic and Asian trade. It was then an 
important obstacle to paralysing an enemy’s economy, whereas interrupting the 
enemy’s colonial commerce was one of the stakes of the Franco-British wars. Because 
of the great efforts made by the powerful Royal Navy and British privateers to control 
neutral shipping and trade, the non-belligerents’ business could be a dangerous and 
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precarious undertaking. But on the whole, the cover of a neutral flag was one of the only 
means left to maintain and secure the belligerents’ commerce. That explains the neutral 
flag’s considerable attraction and its role in worldwide commerce. The non-belligerent 
powers benefitted greatly from transporting the belligerents’ goods and thus improved 
their participation in world navigation and commerce. While, of course, neutral ships 
already served as cover in Europe, in the context of the growth of colonial commerce 
and of globalisation, it was more difficult to distinguish fair neutral activity from partial 
ones. The different faces of neutral commerce blurred the difference between lawful and 
unlawful practices. Whether for commerce with the French by English people 
naturalised as neutral subjects or by the cover of neutral colours, the legal principles of 
European neutrality, such as the security given by a neutral flag or the sincerity of 
transport confirmed by official papers, proved to be not fully suitable for the colonial 
world. They were claimed by neutrals for covering French commerce and escaping 
seizure and condemnation. One of the fundamental questions raised by neutral shipping 
was whether it was possible to determine the nationality of a maritime transport, and if 
so with what level of fairness and certainty. The cover of neutrality challenged the 
imperial policy based on the criterion of nationality. The development of commerce 
outside Europe shows clearly that the flag was not reliable enough. As trade became 
increasingly global, the flows and trade of goods and people through transnational 
networks made hunting down unfair neutral shipping and trade ever more difficult. In 
fact, the problem was not neutrality in itself nor the scope of neutral rights, but rather 
the improper use of neutrality. This was particularly the case in the Caribbean world, 
and to a lesser extent in India, where transfers under neutral cover were facilitated by 
the flow of relations, the proximity of territorial sovereignties, and the difficulty 
controlling colonial commerce. Finally, the study of neutral overseas commerce shows, 
first, that the use of neutrality must be considered as a part of the trend in commercial 
interconnections thanks to the involvement of second-ranked powers; and secondly, 
how trans-imperial commercial exchanges were deeply rooted such that even for the 
world’s most powerful navy could not control global trade. 
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